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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has, for a number of years , 
included in its program of work studies of technological innovation and the socio-economic 
issues associated with this process. Jennifer Robinson, a Visiting Scholar at IIASA during 
1979 and 1980 was a leading contributor to these studies, not only during that period, 
but also during later extended visits, and by means of computer conferencing, an innova-
tive technology in which IIASA has played a development role for international research 
activities. 
This paper is one of the products of her work. 
ALEC M. LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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Technological Learning, Technological 
Substitution, and Teclmological Change 
JENNIFER M. ROBINSON 
PREFATORY NOTE: The innovation process, defined here to incorporate the full cycle from invention 
to full commercialization, is slow. It cannot be encompassed with time horizons of less than 20 years. Many 
innovations require half a century or more to reach commercial maturity. 
M:magement of the innovation process is critical to the management of technology, but the slowness of the 
process makes it difficult for conventional economists or policy makers, who typically consider l 5 years a 
long-term forecast or plan, to understand or control. The situation, in short, is one in which the absence of 
theoretical understanding limits the effectiveness of managerial practice. Accord in gt y one appropriate niche for 
applied systems analysis in this case is the development, application, and testing of theoretical models. 
Toward this end the innovation task force of IIASA's management and technology area is studying the 
mechanisms of technological substitution. One phase of this work is being conducted through construction and 
analysis of a series of dynamic simulation models, TECH!, TECH2, . ., TECHN. 
The present working paper is one of a series describing these models. It puts work described in related 
papers into a broad, somewhat philosophical context. First it brings together into a common framework the 
notions of basic versus improvement innovations and learning curves and process versus product innovation. 
Second, it looks at the relationship of the individual technological substitution to the process of technological 
change as a whole. It is complementary to working papers by the same author entitled "Technological Shift: A 
Cybernetic Exploration [1 l]," a semitechnical description of TECH!, and "Technological Shift: A Graphical 
Exploration of Progress Functions, Technolc.igical Costs and Their Effects on Technological Substitution (12]." 
Later papers in the series will describe TECH2, a variant of TECH restructured to assume a planned 
economy rather than a free market competition, and the application of TECH to historically observed technologi-
cal substitutions. 
ABSTRACT 
From a simple dynamic model of competition between product lines it is shown that the shape of learning 
curves has a powerful influence on the dynamics of technological substitution. Learning of both production 
efficiency and marketing efficiency is considered. It is asserted that both types of learning are important and that 
the two are complementary. It is further speculated that production ·learning is probably more important for 
commodities and in situations of low per capita income, whereas market learning gains ascendancy in cases of 
high income and specialized and diversified product lines. In closing, it is noted that simple competitive models 
are misleading, first because complementarities and coevolutionary processes are probably as important in the 
JENNIFER M. ROBINSON is a research scholar with the IIASA management and technology area task 
force on technological innovation. Apprenticed in systems analysis under D. H. Meadows, she received her 
M.S. in Food and Agricultural Policy from the University of Illinois in 1977. She has worked on the presidential 
commission study Global 2000. 
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overall development of technology as are competitive processes, and second because optimization of the 
technological system 's parts does not guarantee improvement of the performance of the system as a whole . 
Introduction 
Most authors appear to accept the notion that technological change is at least partially 
an optimizing process. There also seems to be a general consensus that optimization takes 
place through technological innovation on different levels . On a low and more or less 
continuous level, small incremental improvements are made to existing processes and 
products. On a higher and relatively discontinuous level the invention of radically new 
technologies (basic innovations) leads to substitution of more adaptive technologies for 
less adaptive ones . There is presently no unified theory associating various levels of 
technological optimization with functional forms. Nonetheless, in common usage lower-
level ' 'improvement innovations' ' appear to correspond to the functional forms called 
" learning curves " or "progress functions," while higher-level "basic innovations" cor-
respond to the typically S-shaped substitution curves . The term "technological change" 
likewise can be equated to the net effect of multiple events of technological progress 
(learning) and technological substitution occurring simultaneously. 
This paper puts the three levels together. It begins by posing a conceptual model of 
technological substitution and investigating the role that efficiency learning (i.e., incre-
mental cost reduction) plays in the substitution process . It then expands the model to 
consider the roles of product improvement and other sorts of learning . It concludes with an 
examination of technological change as a consequence of multiple technological substitu-
tions. The last section stresses the concept that optimization of the parts may not lead to 
optimization of the whole-in other words, that society cannot depend on technological 
progress and technological substitution to lead to socially desirable forms of technological 
change. 
The model assumes a free market in which price is determined by supply and demand 
and supply and demand are affected by price . This by no means precludes using the model 
to examine technological substitution in planned economies. Quite the contrary, by cutting 
the supply-demand-price feedback loops and converting price to a policy variable one 
could use the model to examine the systemic implications of various price policies for old 
and new technology products. This could be very useful to a planning agency that wishes 
to know how government price policies affect and could affect the transition from one 
technology to another. 
Learning in the Context of Technological Substitution 
The real world context in which technical learning occurs is complex and variable. 
However, there are sufficient regularities of form to permit simplification and generaliza-
tion . Here learning is observed in the context of the interaction between two production 
systems that compete for market shares. In the paragraphs that follow we first describe 
that context and then note how learning affects it. In the envisioned structure each 
competing production system can increase output by expanding capacity. Output increase, 
as transmitted through market mechanisms and cost accounting equations, influences both 
further capacity accumulation (through profits) and that portion of consumer purchasing 
habits (i .e., market share changes) that is price determined . 
A causal influence scheme for the structure described thus far is shown below in 
Figure 1. The two pairs of central loops passing through sales describe the growth thrusts 
by which each system might expand. Capacity growth leads to growth of outputs and then 
TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING , SUBSTITUTION , CHANGE 41 
~~~~~ne~ ?l~~;~~ y~4' price price .. ~ .....--....._ .... ~ ne~~~:ACITY ~M:~~~ 1 CAPAC~~~~bld 
costs +' (-1 ~ ~HARE j; 9 t-t costs t~~~estmen _ 't'/ ~ -~investmo~ld;:jd +A {?new ol ' -t -I .\" sales ';ale new 11 old_ profit -tprofit 
Fig. 1. Competitive structure within which technological substitution takes place. 
to decreased prices, increased demand and increased profits, and finally increased invest-
ment and enlarged capacity. This is the drive behind the capacity accelerator of neoclas-
sical economics . 
The outer loops and the light inner lines show cost and price effects that coun-
terbalance these growth forces . Fixed costs increase with capacity and variable costs with 
output . Expended output causes lower prices . Lower prices and higher costs cut into 
profits and thus reduce investment. Of course , reality is much more complex. Prices and 
sales expectations may influence capacity utilization, factor prices may change, and 
dozens of other things might be added. These could be incorporated into the model. For 
clarity, we omit them here . 
Learning curves are easily linked into this structure. For the purpose of this paper a 
learning curve is any functional relationship between a measure of performance and a 
measure of experience . Thus it corresponds to what some [14 , 15] term a progress 
function, and does not necessarily imply that learning is encoded in a human brain. Here, 
initially, learning is explicitly formulated as a functional relationship between cumulative 
output and cost per unit output. The relationship is presumed to take a conventional 
nonincreasing form, as shown in Figure 2. 
learning 
loop weak 
learning 
plateau 
-----------~--------
CUMULATIVE OUTPUT 
Fig. 2. A learning curve. 
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In the model posed above cumulative output is easily calculated by accumulating 
output figures and can be used to drive production costs through the learning curve. This 
linkage, as shown in Figure 3, sets up a positive feedback loop that will begin to lose 
strength as the learning process moves into regions of diminishing returns. 
Given that the learning loop is strong when cumulative output is low and uninfluen-
tial when learning tapers off, new technologies, which tend to be less far along in the 
learning process, will be subject to more vigorous learning growth than their older com-
petitors. Therefore when the learning loop is added to the above model, the model's 
apparent symmetry disappears. Stripping Figure 1 down to its capacity acceleration loops 
and adding learning loops with size proportional to strength yields a system like that 
shown in Figure 4. 
The behavioral tendency created by adding learning loops to this system is consistent 
with the logistic growth process usually observed in the course of technological substitu-
tion, and seems a plausible model for historically observed patterns such as that shown in 
Figure 5 for electricity. As the new technology starts out, learning provides it with a 
powerful dynamic thrust, and by cutting prices while sustaining profits it intrudes upon the 
market of the old technology. As the new technology matures and its learning processes 
slow down, restraints take over and its growth ceases. 
INSIGHTS ON SHAPE 
Almost any way one formalizes the patterns of causation described above leads to the 
conclusion that the course of technological substitution is strongly influenced by the 
shapes and parameters of the old and new technology 's learning curves. I have generally 
found that these questions are relative and not absolute , that the key question is not the 
form of a new technology's learning curve but rather the relative forms of the old and new 
technology's learning curves . Three aspects prove noteworthy: initial efficiency, slope 
(rapidity of efficiency gain) , and ultimate efficiency (point of diminishing returns) . 
The importance of initial efficiency is easily demonstrated by making extreme as-
sumptions . If, for example, one uses a hyperbolic function for the learning curve, the 
costs of producing the first unit of output are infinite while the costs of producing later 
units of output will approach zero as cumulative output became very large. Under these 
conditions, quite clearly, no new technology could ever become established! Even if 
initial costs are finite but relatively high-for example 10 times those of the old technol-
ogy, the new technology will be unable to meet costs and will face heavy losses (unless 
high prices can be sustained). These losses, in turn , make it difficult for the new technol-
ogy to procure investment. 
If, on the other hand, initial costs are very low-for example if they are half those of 
outpu~ CUMULA~E + CA_tACITY 
OUTPUT ~ t 'r ++ ::.J t.estment 
efficiency ~of its ~~osts 
Fig. 3. A learning loop. 
TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING, SUBSTITUTION, CHANGE 43 
N~~new ~ld OLD 
~r:~T~ +;r:::T< _p1ri\=:~t prlice (f C,:~1;; :;·";!~~~~~ new ~- . + tt ~ SHARE T +• + old efficiency new \.' · ,/ ' old efficj.ency f +i .. vestment_ "')& _ inves~;t ! · + _ new~new -t _ old old 
new prof1~ sales sats -f4fit.J. _ old 
co~ ~ ,..,__ costs 
Fig. 4. The forces of technological substitution with learning added. 
the old technology-the new technology will immediately show large profits, which will 
lead to heavy investment, flooded markets , and serious price depression . 
Casual observation confirms the above structural deductions . In real situations there 
has been great variation in the range of relative efficiencies at which new technologies 
have entered the market. Where entry efficiency is too low the innovation fails , unless it 
can find a special market niche in which it can meet its high costs by charging high prices 
[ 17). For example , plastics appeared as substitutes for high-cost materials such as 
whalebone and tortoiseshell before they began to be used in bulk as substitutes for glass , 
metal, ceramics, and wood . Where entry efficiency has been high, as for example in the 
case of competition between natural and synthetic ice in hot climates , or between batch 
and continuous flow operations, the new technology has grown rapidly and its growth has 
typically resulted in what are euphemistically called disorderly markets [10, Ch. 4]. 
After the importance of the relative initial production efficiency of the new technol-
ogy is noted, attention naturally moves to the relative plateau values of old and new 
technology efficiency, that is , to the ratio of asymptote toward which new technology 
production efficiency moves as cumulative output approaches infinity to the equivalent 
asymptote for the old technology. 
Here again it is intuitively clear that the parameter varies greatly between innovations 
and that the variation has important consequences for the process of technological sub-
stitution . The relative ultimate production efficiency of computers as opposed to manual 
computation is best measured in powers of 10. The relative ultimate production efficiency 
of mechanized fruit picking as gauged against manual picking will vary with definition 
and factor prices , but it is probably not far from unity. This helps explain why market 
penetration of mechanized fruit harvesting pattern has been slow and limited to places 
where labor costs are high and why the potential long term impact of computers on society 
is very high. (In general, where relative plateau values are close to unity, factor prices 
become more important in technological substitution .) 
In sum, the parameters of the production efficiency learning curve can be likened to 
those of a chemical chain reaction . The relative initial production efficiency of a technol-
ogy functions like an energy of activation .1 If it is above I , the substitution is vigorous and 
1 For many chemical reactions , including combustion, a certain energy input, like lighting a match, is 
needed to initiate the reaction . Thereafter the reaction releases sufficient energy to keep itself going. The energy 
that must be put in is called the activation energy, and the energy that is produced is called the energy of release. 
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Fig. 5. Electricity costs and percent of dwellings with electricity in the United States: An example of 
the time patterns inherent in the model posed. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (16]. 
self-starting; when it is below 1, the process will only be set off by special circumstances, 
such as a localized situation in which the parameter is above unity, an especially able 
manager who is able to force rapid learning, or policy measures such as creation of 
guaranteed markets that create a niche for the new product. 
Some combination of the slope of the curve and its height relative to that of the 
competing technology determines the energy of release and the rate of reaction. That is, it 
establishes the vigor with which the new technology enters competition and gains market 
share and the extent of the changes affected by the technology's introduction. 
MARKETING PROGRESS 
Innovation and learning have a qualitative as well as an efficiency dimension; that is, 
they affect consumers' willingness to pay as well as production costs. The qualitative 
dimension is a composite that is hard to measure and compare. Nonetheless, something 
can be deduced about its general form . Many objective indices of product quality, includ-
TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING , SUBSTITUTION , CHANGE 45 
ing speed, power, precision, size, and defective rates, can be shown to follow leaming-
curve-type patterns because producers tune technology to suit market preferences . If they 
were more often measured, subjective indices such as comfort, convenience, and in some 
cases even status value could probably also be shown to follow learning curve forms. As a 
composite of learning curve forms we can expect that willingness to pay will also follow a 
learning curve. 
Leaming here may entail at least three different processes occurring singly or in 
combination. First, consumers may learn to like the product; that is, they may either 
overcome ignorance about its use or prejudices against it, or a ''keeping up with the 
Joneses " pattern may make the new product a status symbol. Second, the product's 
support infrastructure may develop in a way that makes the product more useful; for 
example, a buildup of paved roads made automobiles more useful and a buildup of 
broadcasting capabilities enhanced the value to the consumer of radio and television. 
Third , producers may make the product more attractive or more available by product 
innovation, rationalization of marketing channels , or improvement of product-associated 
services and advertisement. All three processes will have the effect of increasing the rate 
at which consumers shift their purchases toward the new technology as it accumulates 
experience. 
The exact mechanisms by which this process occurs probably differ. Consumers ' 
experience with a new product and infrastructure development are probably associated 
with cumulative sales or cumulative product usage, while the form of experience leading 
to product improvements is probably more closely associated with cumulative investment. 
However, because the various possible measures of experience will behave in a fairly 
similar fashion, it is justifiable to aggregate the separate processes into a single feedback 
loop linking cumulative output to expansion of market share, as shown in Figure 6. As 
with the production efficiency learning loop this reinforces the capacity acquisition growth 
loops with additional positive feedback. By increasing new technology sales and market 
share this loop also tends to raise the new technology's price level, which further stimu-
lates profits and growth . 
The matters of form discussed in relation to the learning curve for production effi-
ciency apply well to the sales efficiency learning curve. If the new technology's initial 
~--------._._..__...,~+sales 
( Fefficie~c~+ ~ ~ 
CUMULATIVE~ o~~t---~~pr1ce----
OUTiU+T + T t- OWN + 
• capacity _w MARKET 
production <±,, -t= t INVA:.::_ORY ~ SHARE 
efficiency 
1 ~- i~v.stment 
costs - I + 
---... ____ _, ... profit~•----"' 
Fig. 6. The growth loop of one competing technology with market learning added. 
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sales efficiency is too low relative to that of the old technology the loop acts as a 
constraint. Low sales efficiency prevents market expansion, which leads to losses and no 
investment. Lack of investment prevents both output expansion and expansion of markets 
through gains in sales efficiency. If, however, this constraint can be overcome the vicious 
circle becomes a snowball effect . Leaming gains spur on further growth and further 
learning gains until such time as the system reaches a point of diminishing returns and 
learning ceases to contribute much to further growth. 
Similarly, the vigor with which the new technology invades the old technology 's 
market and the size of barrier it will present to new technologies that might later threaten 
its market share depend on the height and slop of its market learning curve. 
In simulation I find that market-directed learning tends to be a more powerful force 
than process efficiency learning . This appears to be because market-oriented learning 
tends to increase demand more rapidly than supply, thus leading to high prices, high 
profits, and rapid investment. Process efficiency gains, on the other hand, tend to increase 
supply faster than demand, thus leading to price cutting, low profits and low investment. 
In other words, the negative feedback associated with process efficiency gains is stronger 
than that associated with market efficiency gains . 
IMPLICATIONS OF TWOFOLD LEARNING PROCESS 
In the context of the structure posed, both kinds of learning can be very powerful 
influences pushing and restraining the process of technological substitution. When the two 
occur simultaneously the power of each is magnified. In the real world both types of 
learning take place with development of a new technology, with the distribution of the two 
being a function both of the product 's social function and of the scope for product and 
process variation . Production efficiency learning is probably more important for com-
modities, such as electrical power, sugar, or cement, where products are of a pure and 
uniform nature . Market learning generally prevails with complex diversified roles and 
where functional specialization and/or pyschological and taste components have important 
bearing on the product's value to the purchaser (e .g ., machinery and electronic equip-
ment, and consumer goods) . 
Macroeconomic factors also affect the respective strategic values of process and 
market learning . Process learning is most important in circumstances of poverty and 
scarcity. Where willingness to pay heavily is constrained by ability to pay, increasing 
supply and decreasing costs are likely to lead to higher levels of basic consumption rather 
than glutted markets . Market learning is more critical in circumstances of affluence and 
plenty. 
The above discussion may have sounded like it pertains to consumer goods only. 
However, rising incomes probably lead to increased emphasis on market learning for 
producer goods as well, for two reasons. First, the pressure for diversified, user-oriented 
consumer goods forces managers to deal with more complex situations in which they place 
much more exacting specifications on the equipment they use. It becomes more critical 
whether the machine will perform the task required reliably and precisely than how much 
the machine costs. A machine with a purchase price of $50,000 that fits smoothly into the 
production line is to be preferred to a $5000 bottleneck. 
Second, market learning is a good strategy for averting the competitive pressures of a 
market dominated by efficiency learning. For example, as the market for computer chips 
becomes increasingly flooded, the advantage turns toward the firm that develops attractive 
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user-oriented software. Here market learning can permit the maintenance of favorable 
prices even with a flood market. 
The supposition that market learning becomes more important as incomes rise leads 
to an important digression. If this supposition is true and in the last few decades the 
developed countries have undergone an overarching transition toward market as opposed 
to production learning, one would expect to see a fundamental, though perhaps subtle, 
change in the nature of technological change. Instead of more efficient basic machinery 
one would expect more sophisticated and diversified techniques and design improvement, 
criteria of convenience, and consumer appeal to prevail over efficient quantity production. 
It remains for me a nagging question whether the current sense of technical slow-
down is indeed a real slowdown or simply a change in direction. Are we really faced with 
a technological stalemate [8], or have we simply outgrown one phase of technical de-
velopment and moved on to another? 
Technological Change 
As a dilettante evolutionary biologist, I laugh at the images posed above for the 
simple, naive Darwinism. Extend the model and one envisions a world mechanistically 
and teleologically moving toward greater efficiency and sophistication through the forces 
of innovation (mutation), _learning (natural selection), and competition. 
The world you and I inhabit is at once more complex and wonderful than the 
competitive model posed above and much less certain of progressing toward a state of 
happy perfection. 
Concerning the complex and wonderful, the system is not simply dog eat dog . 
Coevolutionary processes based on mutualism and complementarity between innovations 
are probably as important in technological change as are competitive evolutionary trends. 
Such patterns are repeatedly described in David Landes' epic work The Unbound Pro-
metheus [ 6] and are given the name "technological convergence" by Nathan Rosenberg 
[13]. Landes (p. 86), for example, describes a sequence in which the flying shuttle and 
other improvements in weaving technology created economic pressure for faster and 
greater spinning production. This led to the invention of the spinning jenny and the spin-
ning mule. These were so efficient that they placed pressure both on weaving and on the 
cleaning and sorting of fibers. Two similar examples from the present century are as 
follows . Electrification created opportunities for a large number of mechanical innova-
tions, and the diffusion of multiple electrical innovations created a demand for electricity. 
Product diversity created a niche for modem retailing technologies, such as supermarket 
chains, and supermarkets provide orderly and efficient marketing for a diversified 
spectrum of goods [10, Ch. 4] . 
Concerning the less wonderful, there is no reason to believe that progressive learning 
of a system's parts is consistent with the welfare of the whole. As Garrett Hardin dra-
matically pointed out in "The Tragedy of the Commons" [5], situations in which all 
decision makers optimize individual benefits can lead to destruction of the resource base 
of the system as a whole. The general efficiency-optimizing trends found throughout the 
whole of technology may well lead the technosphere into patterns of development that can 
neither be sustained nor reversed without traumatic reorganization. 
Energy is a case in point. Many technosystems (ecosystem plus technology) spent the 
last few centuries with many of their parts optimizing under conditions of cheap energy 
and the whole of developed country economics evolved in energy intensive directions . 
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Today it appears that the net effect of that trend may have been to undermine the technical 
basis of Western civilization by depleting energy supplies faster than technology can adapt 
to energy scarcity-or to increase the COi concentration in the atmosphere in a fashion 
that will seriously affect the earth's climate. 
Reduction of diversity poses another sort of problem. Efficient fine tuning of an 
ecosystem's organisms may make the whole inflexible and vulnerable to catastrophe. It is, 
for example, speculated that waves of extinction, such as that which eliminated the 
dinosaurs, were brought about by a process of natural gene-pool narrowing during 
geologic epocs with monotonous climate and landscape [ 1]. Many plant geneticists fear 
that the modern reliance on increasingly uniform strains of a dozen or so food plant 
species has purchased high efficiency at the cost of introducing high genetic vulnerability 
[2, 9]. 
Genetic burden may be another case . The proliferation of complex synthetic chemi-
cals and radioactive material brought about by 20th century technologies increases the 
probability of mutation. Many mutations are sublethal and thus are passed on from 
generation to generation. In the absence of natural selection-and the number of human 
beings who fail to live to reproductive age is too low in the developed world to permit 
natural selection-the number of minor sublethal genetic defects in the human population 
can only increase. This, in theory, will inevitably lead to a higher incidence of birth 
defects and a general decline in human health . 
Although the comprehensive work on the subject has yet to appear, there seems to be 
a prevailing hunch among scholars working on technological innovation [3, 4, 7] that the 
cycles of innovations and the Kondratief wave are somehow linked to a tendency of many 
technological trends to reach learning plateaus together. If this indeed proves to be the 
case, it would be another case where uncontrolled learning of subsystems is destabilizing 
to the system as a whole. 
This evokes a closing observation that in the next decades and centuries the most 
important learning curve for humanity may not be that of the market or of production, but 
of system control. The largest technical substitution in the last several centuries has been 
the substitution of human-controlled technical processes for natural ones. All too often 
this means replacement of a passive system with intricate and effective homeostatic 
capabilities by an aggressive but poorly balanced system. In many places such substitu-
tions have undermined or threatened to undermine life support systems. For most of the 
world's people they have failed to bring a substantial increase in the material standard of 
living. It is fairly clear that free-form growth of technical systems will not eliminate these 
problems. It remains to us to create a viable alternative. 
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